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Is it a Violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to
Require a Spouse to Guarantee a Loan? If Not, it
Should be.
I. INTRODUCTION
Access to credit is an integral part of our economic structure. 1
Credit, which has not always been simple to obtain, is necessary for most
people to purchase a home or invest in a business. 2 In the past, women
seeking out loans were frequently rejected from obtaining credit despite
being otherwise creditworthy candidates.3 Often this was due to
discriminatory lending practices. 4 In an effort to counteract the
discriminatory practices involved in credit lending, Congress enacted the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) in 1974. 5 The ECOA protects
creditworthy borrowers from being denied credit based on a number of
characteristics that have no bearing on their ability to repay a loan. 6 One
1. See Todd Zywicki, “Consumer Credit and the American Economy,” Part I:
Consumer Demand for Credit, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/13/consumer-credit-andthe-american-economy-part-i-consumer-demand-for-credit/?utm_term=.510c93cab79c
(“Evidence shows that three-fifths to two-thirds of families have such credit outstanding at
any one time in recent decades and that most consumers use consumer credit at least sometime
during their financial lifetime.”).
2. Id.
3. See Allen Abraham, Credit Discrimination Based on Gender: The Need to Expand
the Rights of a Spousal Guarantor Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 10 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 473, 478 (2016) (“‘[D]ivorced, separated or widowed wom[en were]
considered a bad credit risk because [they were] without male support, financial or
otherwise.”).
4. See id. (quoting Comment, Credit Equality Comes to Women: An Analysis of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 960, 965 nn.28–29 (1976)) (“Some
creditors went as far as requiring women to sign an affidavit ‘swearing not to endanger their
ability to repay their debts by having children.’”).
5. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521
(1974) (codified 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016)) (“It is the purpose of this Act to require that
financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of credit make that credit
equally available to all creditworthy customers without regard to sex or marital status.”).
6. Id.; see Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Amends Rules to Provide Flexibility
and Clarity to Certain Mortgage Lenders in Collecting Information, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpbamends-rules-provide-flexibility-and-clarity-certain-mortgage-lenders-collectinginformation/ (“The Equal Credit Opportunity Act is a federal civil rights law that protects
against discrimination in the financial marketplace. Regulation B, the CFPB’s rule
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such characteristic is marital status, in addition to race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, age, receipt of public assistance income, and the
good faith exercise of any rights under the Consumer Credit Protection
Act.7
Although the ECOA was enacted to eliminate unfair lending
practices, credit lending discrimination still occurs. Hawkins v.
Community Bank of Raymore brought an oft-considered issue to the
Supreme Court of the United States: whether it is a violation of the
ECOA to require a spouse to guarantee a loan. 8 This issue has been
litigated in a number of different jurisdictions, with no clear-cut answer
rendered.9 While courts were hopeful Hawkins would bring closure to
the debate, an eight-member Supreme Court demonstrated how judicial
philosophies are split on this issue through an equally divided per curiam
decision. 10 Until the Supreme Court creates binding precedent on all
circuits, creditors, borrowers, and lower courts are left in the dark as to
what they should do when it comes to a spouse guaranteeing a loan. 11

implementing ECOA, includes restrictions regarding lenders’ ability to ask consumers about
their race, color, religion, national origin or sex, except in certain circumstances.”).
7. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 (1974)
(codified 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016)) (“The Congress finds that there is a need to insure that the
various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extensions of credit exercise their
responsibility to make credit available with fairness, impartiality, and without discrimination
on the basis of sex or marital status.”).
8. See generally Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1072 (2016).
9. See Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072 (rendering an equally divided Supreme Court per
curiam); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 380,
385 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding the ECOA definition to be ambiguous and instead relying on the
Regulation B definition and ultimately ruling spousal guarantors are considered applicants);
Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding
wives are not considered applicants and therefore spouses cannot use the ECOA as protection
when they are guarantors).
10. See Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072 (illustrating how challenging this matter is since the
Supreme Court could not find a definitive answer to the question of whether or not a spousal
guarantor could be considered an applicant under the ECOA); Evan Weinberger, High Court
Splits On Whether Loan Guarantors Are Applicants, LAW360 (Oct. 5, 2015), https://w
ww.law360.com/articles/707802/high-court-splits-on-whether-loan-guarantors-areapplicants (“As the high court heard arguments in the Hawkins v. Community Bank of
Raymore case over loans for a failed real estate development, a rift opened between the court’s
conservative bloc, led by Justice Antonin Scalia, and liberal wing over whether the Fed had
the authority to specifically state in 1985 that spousal guarantors could bring a discrimination
claim even though that right was not specifically provided in the ECOA.”).
11. See Kathryn Reed Edge, Bank on it: Circuit Split on Definition of “Applicant” 50
TENN. B.J. 28, 29 (2014) (“Until this issue is resolved by the United States Supreme Court, if
ever, bankers in the 8th Circuit will wonder whether they should listen to the judiciary or
Federal Reserve examiners who frequent their banks.”).
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If a nine-member Supreme Court heard this issue and interpreted
the language of the ECOA by using a Chevron analysis, the legal
determination would likely be the same as it was in the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in Hawkins, holding that spousal guarantors are not protected by
the ECOA. 12 Due to this likely outcome, Congress should amend the
ECOA to include protection for spousal guarantors.13
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part II explains the history and
background of the ECOA as well as Regulation B. 14 Part III analyzes the
decision in Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore.15 Part IV examines
holdings in different circuits and what it means to be an “applicant” under
both the ECOA’s statutory language and according to Regulation B. 16
Part V discusses the potential impact of adopting each definition of
“applicant.”17 Part VI presents recommendations to avoid future
confusion about spousal guarantors. 18
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT AND
REGULATION B
Before the ECOA put safeguards in place, women had difficulty
obtaining credit.19 It was not only a challenge for single or divorced
women, but also for married women. 20 Often, married women would be
denied credit unless their husbands guaranteed their debts. 21 Creditors
frequently succumbed to outdated and unsubstantiated beliefs and would
12. See Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (explaining if there is no ambiguity in the statutory
language, then the Court is to follow the definition within the statute).
13. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(5) (2017) (“The applicant’s spouse may serve as an additional
party [supporting the application], but the creditor shall not require that the spouse be the
additional party.”); RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 383 (“[A] portion of Regulation B . . .
refer[red] to as the ‘spousal-guarantor rule,’ which prohibits a creditor from requiring an
applicant’s spouse to guarantee a credit instrument, even if the creditor requires someone to
execute a guaranty.”).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. Abraham, supra note 3, at 477–78.
20. Abraham, supra note 3.
21. See Abraham, supra note 3 (quoting Comment, Credit Equality Comes to Women:
An Analysis of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 960, 965 nn.28–29
(1976)) (“Some creditors went as far as requiring women to sign an affidavit ‘swearing not to
endanger their ability to reap their best by having children.’”).
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deny a woman credit based on the idea that “she would be [too] distracted
by child care or some other stereotypically female responsibility,” and
therefore would be too much of a credit risk. 22 The ECOA was enacted
in response to lenders requiring spousal guarantees, and set out to “make
credit available with fairness, impartiality, and without discrimination on
the basis of sex or marital status.”23 Therefore, Congress made it
“unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant . . . on
the basis of . . . sex or marital status” regarding any aspect of a credit
transaction.24
When the ECOA was first enacted, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve (“Board”) was responsible for its implementation. 25
However, after the 2008 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”)
transferred the authority of overseeing the ECOA to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). 26 Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the
CFPB was granted rule-making authority within its jurisdiction, and was
also given authority to supervise and enforce compliance with the ECOA
and its implementing regulations.27 In keeping with the intended purpose
of the ECOA, the CFPB adopted Regulation B, which makes it unlawful
for a creditor to refuse credit to an otherwise creditworthy applicant on
the basis of sex, marital status, or any other prohibited basis. 28
22. Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“[I]t is apparent that what the Act was intended to do was to forbid a creditor to deny credit
to a woman on the basis of a belief that she would not be a good credit risk because she would
be distracted by child care or some other stereotypically female responsibility.”).
23. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-435, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 (1974)
(codified 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016)).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b) (2016); 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(3)(C) (2016) (“[T]he [CFPB] shall
prescribe regulations to prohibit . . . abusive or unfair lending practices that promote
disparities among consumers of equal credit worthiness but of different race, ethnicity,
gender, or age”); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754
F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Congress mandated that the agency charged with overseeing
ECOA—first the Federal Reserve, now the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau—
promulgate regulations ‘to carry out the [statute’s] purposes.’”).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(3)(C); Valerie L. Hletko & Caroline M. Stapleton, Deference
in Decline: ECOA’s Regulation B and Agency Discretion Might Not Be Broad Enough to
Include Spousal Guarantors, 104 BANKING REP. (BNA) NO. 3 (Jan. 20, 2015) (“The CFPB
inherited the Board’s implementing regulations, including Regulation B, and accompanying
administrative interpretations.”).
28. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.1(b) (2017) (“The purpose . . . is to promote the availability of credit
to all creditworthy applicants without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
marital status, or age.”).
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Spousal guarantors are treated differently depending on whether
the court chooses to adopt the ECOA or Regulation B definition. The
major discrepancy between the two arises from one word: applicant. 29
An “applicant,” as defined in the ECOA, is “any person who applies to a
creditor directly for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, or
applies to a creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an
amount exceeding a previously established credit limit.”30 While this
appears to be a straightforward definition, the ECOA’s definition of
“applicant” differs slightly from that of Regulation B. 31
Prior to 1985, guarantors were excluded from Regulation B’s
definition of applicant.32 However, the Board broadened Regulation B’s
scope after learning credit discrimination was still occurring and having
an impact on individuals guaranteeing loans.33 Regulation B now defines
“applicant” as “any person who requests or has received an extension of
credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may become
contractually liable regarding an extension of credit. For purposes of
[section] 1002.7(d), the term includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and
similar parties.”34
These differing definitions raise the issue of whether a
“guarantor” can be considered an “applicant.”35 The simple answer is
that under the ECOA, maybe; under Regulation B, yes. 36

29.
30.
31.
32.

Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2016), with 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (2017).
15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b).
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b), with 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e).
Revision of the Board’s Equal Credit Regulation: An Overview, 71 FED. RES. BULL.
12, 913, 918 (Dec. 1985) (defining “applicant” as “any person who requests or who has
received an extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may be
contractually liable regarding an extension of credit other than a guarantor, surety, endorser,
or similar party”).
33. Id. (“After weighing the various considerations, the Board revised the definition of
applicant to include guarantors. It based the action on the premise that although its primary
concern may have been to protect the individual seeking credit, the Congress had a broader
purpose in enacting the ECOA: to bar discrimination on the basis of marital status in any
aspect of a credit transaction.”); Hletko & Stapleton, supra note 27 (citing Revision of the
Board’s Equal Credit Regulation: An Overview, 71 FED. RES. BULL. 12, 913, 918 (Dec.
1985)) (“The Board reasoned that a person required to ‘assume a debt obligation’ as a
guarantor due to marriage ‘has suffered discrimination based on marital status’ within the
meaning of ECOA.”).
34. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (amending Regulation B’s definition of “applicant” to include
“guarantors”).
35. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b), with 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e).
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The issue of whether or not a guarantor is an applicant has
become a problem in the realm of spouses guaranteeing loans, commonly
referred to as spousal guarantors.37 When the Board promulgated
Regulation B, it included the spousal guarantor rule. 38 The spousal
guarantor rule prohibits creditors from requiring that a spouse guarantee
the other spouse’s debt, even if a guarantor is necessary for a creditor to
extend the line of credit.39 While it is lawful for a spouse to guarantee a
loan, under Regulation B it is unlawful for a creditor to require the spouse
to be a guarantor.40 Under the spousal guarantor rule, if a spouse was
forced into guaranteeing a loan, the spouse would be able to raise an
ECOA violation as an affirmative defense to the creditor’s action in the
event of a default, and the entire debt may be voided and therefore
uncollectable. 41 However, the ECOA definition includes no such
provision.42 The discrepancy between the competing definitions in
ECOA and Regulation B was brought to bear in Hawkins.43
37. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(5) (2017) (“The applicant’s spouse may serve as an additional
party [supporting the application], but the creditor shall not require that the spouse be the
additional party.”); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754
F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[A] portion of Regulation B . . . refer[red] to as the ‘spousalguarantor rule,’ which prohibits a creditor from requiring an applicant’s spouse to guarantee
a credit instrument, even if the creditor requires someone to execute a guaranty.”).
38. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(5).
39. Id. (“The applicant’s spouse may serve as an additional party [supporting the
application], but the creditor shall not require that the spouse be the additional party.”).
40. Id.
41. See Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB, 167 F.3d 667, 672 (1st Cir. 1999) (allowing ECOA
violations to be raised as an affirmative defense of recoupment); Silverman v. Eastrich
Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 32–33 (3d Cir. 1995) (permitting defendants to use
violations of the ECOA as an affirmative defense for recoupment); Bank of the West v. Kline,
782 N.W.2d 453, 462–63 (Iowa 2010) (accepting violations of the ECOA to be raised as an
affirmative defense of illegality, which would completely invalidate the debt created from the
violation); see also Ronald Mann, Justices Dubious Of Protections For Spousal Guarantors,
LAW360 (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/709196/justices-dubious-ofprotections-for-spousal-guarantors (“[I]f “applicant” is extended to include “guarantor,” then
the logical consequence would be that the guarantors have the right to invalidate the entire
loan, not just their guaranties — a considerable windfall for the borrower.”); Hletko &
Stapleton, supra note 27 (“[A] guarantor seeking to invalidate his or her guaranty based on
an ECOA violation could render a debt entirely uncollectable.”) (emphasis added); but see RL
BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 386 (emphasis added) (“A creditor will only lose its entire debt if
the borrower immediately defaults and the pledged collateral turns out to be worthless.”).
42. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016).
43. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1072 (2016); Hawkins v. Cmty.
Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 939–40 (8th Cir. 2014); Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of
Raymore, No. 12-CV-00670-DW, 2013 WL 12074971, at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 16, 2013);
Weinberger, supra note 10 (“The case concerns whether Missouri-based Cmty. Bank of
Raymore improperly required Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson to sign on as guarantors
for more than $2 million in loans that their husbands took out to fund a failed real estate
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III. HAWKINS V. COMMUNITY BANK OF RAYMORE44
The dispute in Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore arose
when co-owners of PHC Development, LLC (“PHC”) took out a loan
requiring their wives to sign as guarantors.45 Gary Hawkins and Chris
Patterson owned PHC.46 Between 2005 and 2008, the Community Bank
of Raymore (“Community Bank”) made four loans to PHC, totaling more
than $2,000,000.47 With each of these loans, the co-owners and their
respective wives executed personal guarantees to Community Bank to
secure the loans. 48 In April 2012, PHC defaulted on its loans from
Community Bank.49 Community Bank accelerated payment on the loans
and demanded payment from PHC as well as Ms. Hawkins and Ms.
Patterson (“the wives”) as guarantors.50
As guarantors, the wives were liable for the defaulted payments;
however, if they demonstrated that the lenders violated the ECOA by
requiring a spouse to guarantee a loan, it is likely, or at least possible, the
loan would be deemed void and would not need to be repaid. 51 The
decision of whether the wives owed $2,000,000 in debt hinged on the
interpretation of the word “applicant.”52 If the wives were deemed

development in Peculiar, Missouri. Hawkins and Patterson allege that the bank violated a
Fed[eral] rule aimed at preventing discrimination against women based on their marital status
by requiring them to serve as guarantors on the loans.”).
44. Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072; Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 937; Hawkins, 2013 WL
12074971, at *3; Weinberger, supra note 10 (“The case concerns whether Missouri-based
Community Bank of Raymore improperly required Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson to
sign on as guarantors for more than $2 million in loans that their husbands took out to fund a
failed real estate development in Peculiar, Missouri. Hawkins and Patterson allege that the
bank violated a Fed[eral] rule aimed at preventing discrimination against women based on
their marital status by requiring them to serve as guarantors on the loans.”).
45. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 939.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see Mann, supra note 41 (“[I]f ‘applicant’ is extended to include ‘guarantor,’ then
the logical consequence would be that the guarantors have the right to invalidate the entire
loan, not just their guaranties — a considerable windfall for the borrower.”); Hletko &
Stapleton, supra note 27 (emphasis added) (“[A] guarantor seeking to invalidate his or her
guaranty based on an ECOA violation could render a debt entirely uncollectable.”); but see
RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 386 (6th
Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (“A creditor will only lose its entire debt if the borrower
immediately defaults and the pledged collateral turns out to be worthless.”).
52. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2016), with 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (2017).
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“applicants,” then the spousal guarantees were in violation of the
ECOA. 53 If the wives were not considered applicants, then the loan
agreements are enforceable and the wives, as guarantors, were
responsible for the defaulted loan payments. 54
The wives filed an action against Community Bank in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, seeking
damages and an order declaring the guarantees void and unenforceable. 55
The wives alleged Community Bank required them to execute the
guarantees securing PHC’s loans solely because they were married to
their respective husbands; they claimed this was discrimination on the
basis of their marital status, in violation of the ECOA. 56 On summary
judgment, the district court concluded the wives were not “applicants”
under the ECOA and, therefore, Community Bank did not violate the
ECOA by requiring the wives to execute the guarantees. 57 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Community Bank. 58
The wives appealed to the Eighth Circuit. 59 They relied on
Regulation B’s definition of “applicant,” which includes guarantors, to
argue that they qualified as applicants within the meaning of the ECOA. 60
The Eighth Circuit examined whether it would be appropriate to rely on
Regulation B’s definition of applicant or if it would instead need to use
the statutory language of the ECOA, noting that if the wives did not
qualify as applicants, then Community Bank did not violate the ECOA
by requiring the wives to execute the guarantees. 61 Additionally, if the
53. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b).
55. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, No. 12-CV-00670-DW, 2013 WL 12074971,

at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 16, 2013).
56. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 939 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[The wives]
alleged that Community had required them to execute the guaranties securing PHC’s loans
solely because they are married to their respective husbands. They claimed that this
requirement constituted discrimination against them on the basis of their marital status in
violation of the ECOA.”); Hawkins, 2013 WL 12074971, at *3.
57. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 940 (“The district court concluded that Hawkins and Patterson
were not ‘applicants’ within the meaning of the ECOA and thus that Community had not
violated the ECOA by requiring them to execute the guaranties.”); Hawkins, 2013 WL
12074971, at *3.
58. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 940; Hawkins, 2013 WL 12074971, at *3.
59. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 940.
60. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (2017); see id. at 940–41 (“Hawkins and Patterson argue that
they qualify as applicants within the meaning of the ECOA because they guaranteed PHC’s
debt to Community. They do not argue that they qualify as applicants on any other basis.”).
61. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 941 (“This case turns, then, on whether we should apply [12
C.F.R. § 1002.2(e)’s] definition of applicant, which would permit Hawkins and Patterson to
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wives were able to rely on Regulation B, then the wives would be able to
cite the spousal guarantor rule and raise an ECOA violation as an
affirmative defense.62 If the wives were only able to rely on the language
within the ECOA, which does not reference spousal guarantors, then the
wives would only be able to file a counterclaim against Community Bank
if they believed there was an ECOA violation. 63
The Eighth Circuit applied the Chevron64 test to decide whether
it should use the statutory definition provided, or if the court needed to
adopt the agency’s definition from Regulation B. 65 The Chevron test
consists of two prongs.66 The first prong requires the court to consider
whether the statutory language clearly speaks to the question at issue. 67
If the court is able to determine Congress’ intent, then the statute will
suffice, and the inquiry will end with no need to look at the second
prong. 68 If the statutory language is considered ambiguous and the
legislative intent is not easily understood, then the court will move on to

pursue an ECOA claim as applicants solely because they executed guarantees to secure PHC’s
loans.”).
62. See Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB, 167 F.3d 667, 672 (1st Cir. 1999) (allowing
defendants to raise an affirmative defense of recoupment); Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple
Investor Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 32–33 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding ECOA violations can be raised
as an affirmative defense of recoupment); Bank of the West v. Kline, 782 N.W.2d 453, 462–
63 (Iowa 2010) (ruling that violations to the ECOA may be used as an affirmative defense of
illegality); see also Revision of the Board’s Equal Credit Regulation: An Overview, 71 FED.
RES. BULL. 12, at 919 (“[Including guarantors as applicants] is also consistent with the
congressional intent for enforcement through private lawsuits because it gives the guarantor
the right to bring a lawsuit or to file a counterclaim against a creditor. To recover damages,
the guarantor must prove that the creditor violated the signature rules and also must establish
the damages suffered.”).
63. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016); Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Linch,
829 F. Supp. 163, 169 (E.D. Va. 1993) (denying defendants the opportunity to raise an ECOA
violation as an affirmative defense, and only allowing claims or counterclaims to be brought).
64. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
65. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 940–41 (“To determine whether we should defer to the Federal
Reserve’s interpretation of the ECOA’s definition of applicant, we apply the two-step
framework established by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.”).
66. Id.
67. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (“First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”).
68. Id. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”); North Dakota v. E.P.A., 730 F.3d 750, 763 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Baptist
Health v. Thompson, 458 F.3d 768, 773 (8th Cir. 2006)) (“[W]e ask first whether the intent
of Congress is clear as to the precise question at issue. If, by employing traditional tools of
statutory construction, we determine that Congress’ intent is clear, that is the end of the
matter.”).
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the second prong. 69 If the second prong analysis is necessary, the court
will consider whether the agency’s definition of the ambiguous statutory
language is a reasonable interpretation in light of the plain language of
the statute.70
In Hawkins, the Eighth Circuit looked at the first prong of the test
and concluded there was no ambiguity in the statutory language. 71 This
meant the court would rely on the definition of “applicant” coming
directly from Congress in the ECOA and not consider Regulation B’s
definition.72 The court explained, “the text of the ECOA clearly provides
that a person does not qualify as an applicant under the statute solely by
virtue of executing a guarantee to secure the debt of another.” 73 The court
further clarified, “a person is an applicant only if she requests credit,” 74
and that “a person does not, by executing a guarantee, request credit.”75
This led the Eighth Circuit to its ultimate decision that “a guarantor does
not request credit and therefore cannot qualify as an applicant under the
unambiguous text of the ECOA.” 76 Therefore, the court concluded that
Community Bank did not violate the ECOA by requiring spousal
guarantees.77
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the wives’ claims on appeal;
it seemed as if courts and creditors would finally receive an answer on

69. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation.”).
70. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”); E.P.A., 730 F.3d at 763.
71. Hawkins, 761 F.3d at 941–42 (“Applying the first step of the Chevron framework,
we conclude that the text of the ECOA clearly provides that a person does not qualify as an
applicant under the statute solely by virtue of executing a guaranty to secure the debt of
another.”).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 941.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 942 (“Because the text of the ECOA is unambiguous regarding whether a
guarantor constitutes an applicant, we will not defer to the Federal Reserve’s interpretation of
applicant, and we can conclude that a guarantor is not protected from marital-status
discrimination by the ECOA.”).
77. Id. at 943 (“Accordingly, we conclude that Hawkins and Patterson are not applicants
under the ECOA, and thus Community did not violate the ECOA by requiring them to execute
the guaranties.”).
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whether a spousal guarantor is an applicant subject to the ECOA. 78
Unfortunately, what was supposed to provide clarity only left more
confusion surrounding the issue. 79 After the death of Justice Antonin
Scalia, the remaining eight Justices could not reach a majority, leaving
the equally divided Supreme Court to affirm the Eighth Circuit through a
one sentence, per curiam decision.80 As a result, Hawkins is only binding
on the Eighth Circuit and serves merely as a reference that other federal
and state courts may look to for guidance. 81
IV. CIRCUIT SPLITS AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF
“APPLICANT”
A number of courts have heard cases regarding discrimination on
the basis of marital status in violation of the ECOA. 82 The Seventh
Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit, found the ECOA’s definition of
“applicant” to be unambiguous and not to include spousal guarantors. 83
However, the Sixth Circuit relied on Regulation B’s definition of
“applicant” because the court found the ECOA definition ambiguous,

78. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937
(2014) (No. 13-3065).
79. Weinberger, supra note 10 (“Justice Sonia Sotomayor said that the common
understanding of ‘applicant’ backed the government and petitioners’ position. ‘And they
don’t suggest it has to be for yourself: It could be you’re asking for an extension of credit for
anyone,’ she said.” . . . “Justice Elena Kagan asked Brian H. Fletcher, the assistant to the
solicitor general arguing the government’s position, whether granting spouses the right to
challenge the requirement that they sign on to a loan opened up ‘liability on a scale that
Congress wouldn’t have expected because . . . the guarantor can come in and declare the entire
loan invalid and the damages would be much higher.’ ‘There’s nothing at all unreasonable
about requiring a lender that has improperly demanded a guaranty to not be able to enjoy the
benefit of that guaranty,’ Fletcher said.”).
80. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1072 (2016); The U.S. Supreme
Court Will Return with Only 8 Justices, FORTUNE (Sept. 30, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/
09/30/us-supreme-court-justices/; Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme
Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/
antonin-scalia-death.html.
81. See Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. 107, 111 (1868) (explaining equally divided
decisions are not “an authority for other cases of like character”).
82. Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072 (rendering an equally divided Supreme Court per
curiam); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 380
(6th Cir. 2014) (ruling guarantors are considered applicants, and therefore spousal guarantors
may seek protection under the ECOA); Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co.,
476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding wives are not considered applicants and therefore
spouses cannot use the ECOA as protection when they are guarantors).
83. Moran, 476 F.3d at 436.
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holding that requiring a spousal guarantee violated the ECOA. 84
Additionally, other circuits have deferred to Regulation B’s definition of
“applicant,” without conducting a Chevron analysis to arrive at this
decision. 85
A.

Courts Finding the ECOA’s Definition Unambiguous

Several courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in Moran Foods v.
Mid-Atlantic Market Development Co., LLC, have ruled that the ECOA
definition of “applicant” is unambiguous and relied on the language
within the ECOA to define the word. 86 Mid-Atlantic was a grocery store
owned by defendant Roger Camp, and a franchisee of Moran Foods. 87
Mid-Atlantic owed Moran Foods money for groceries, but could not pay
and defaulted on its loans.88 Camp’s wife, Susan, had guaranteed the
company’s debt, but refused to honor the guarantees. 89 Moran Foods
sued for breach of contract, and Mrs. Camp counterclaimed, alleging that
Moran had violated the ECOA by requiring her to guarantee loans. 90
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by noting the ECOA’s
express purpose was to increase the availability of credit for women, and
to ensure that creditors did not deny women credit solely on the basis of

84. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 380.
85. Hletko & Stapleton, supra note 27 (“Since the 1985 Amendment to Regulation B,

courts historically have deferred to the Board’s interpretation and permitted spousal
guarantors to bring claims under ECOA. The majority of state and federal courts considering
this issue, including the First, Third and Fourth Circuits, have axiomatically applied the
expanded definition without reaching the question of agency deference under the two-step
Chevron framework.”).
86. Moran, 476 F.3d at 441 (“But there is nothing ambiguous about ‘applicant’ and no
way to confuse an applicant with a guarantor.”).
87. Id. at 437 (“We shall simplify ruthlessly. Moran Foods franchises grocery stores
under the name ‘Save-A-Lot’ and sells the stores many of the groceries they need. MidAtlantic . . . was one of the franchisees.”).
88. Id. (“Mid-Atlantic’s stores faltered, and eventually defaulted, leaving it owing Moran
a considerable amount of money for groceries bought but not paid for. Mid-Atlantic later
declared bankruptcy.”).
89. Id. (“Roger Camp, the owner of Mid-Atlantic, and his wife, Susan Camp, had
guaranteed the company’s debts to Moran.”).
90. See id. (“When they refused to honor their guaranties, Moran brought this suit for
breach of contract against the two Camps plus Mid-Atlantic. Mid-Atlantic and Susan Camp
counterclaimed. . . . Susan Camp claimed that Moran had violated the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, which so far as relates to this case forbids ‘any creditor to discriminate
against any applicant with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of . . .
marital status.”).
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their gender.91 The court went on to assert that Mrs. Camp “was not an
applicant for credit,”92 rather she “guaranteed her husband’s debt.” 93 The
Seventh Circuit looked at the statutory language defining “applicant” to
determine whether or not it was ambiguous. 94 The court concluded “there
is nothing ambiguous about ‘applicant’ and no way to confuse an
applicant with a guarantor.”95
The court acknowledged that Congress likely would not have
included guarantors as “applicants” because it would open “vistas of
liability” they never intended. 96 The “vistas of liability” refer to the
potential negative impacts of adopting Regulation B’s definition. 97
Among the negative impacts is the amount of debt that could be forgiven
if a spousal guarantor were to succeed on an ECOA violation claim. 98 A
violation of the ECOA would allow guarantors to void more than just
their guarantee, it would also allow the guarantors to invalidate the entire
loan. 99
In Moran, the court found that the creditor was not forcing a
spousal guarantee; rather, the creditor was ensuring he could seize the
assets if a default occurred.100 After the creditor noticed several
91. See id. at 441 (explaining that a purpose of ECOA was to eliminate the assumption
of a woman’s role in childcare negatively affecting their credit worthiness).
92. Id. (“Susan Camp was not an applicant for credit, and neither received credit nor was
denied it.”).
93. Id. (“Instead she guaranteed her husband’s debt and by doing so enabled his company
to buy groceries from Moran on credit.”).
94. See id. (including the definition of the Board before the CFPB took control of ECOA
regulation).
95. Id.
96. Id. (“What is more, to interpret ‘applicant’ as embracing ‘guarantor’ opens vistas of
liability that the Congress that enacted the Act would have been unlikely to accept.”).
97. See id. (explaining that the Congress that enacted the Act would have been unlikely
to accept such vistas).
98. See id. (“For then, as Susan Camp (not content with the modest damages that she
obtained in the district court) contends in the cross-appeal, the guaranty would be
unenforceable and the creditor might lose the entire debt.”).
99. Id.; Mann, supra note 41 (“Justices Anthony Kennedy and Elena Kagan were
concerned about another problem, emphasized by Judge Richard Posner in a lower court
opinion on the topic: if ‘applicant’ is extended to include ‘guarantor,’ then the logical
consequence would be that the guarantors have the right to invalidate the entire loan, not just
their guaranties—a considerable windfall for the borrower. As Justice Kagan put it in
questioning Fletcher, “this actually creates liability on a scale that Congress wouldn’t have
expected because if you are right, the guarantor can come in and declare the entire loan
invalid.”).
100. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(2) (2017) (“If an applicant requests unsecured credit and
relies in part upon property that the applicant owns jointly with another person to satisfy the
creditor’s standards of creditworthiness, the creditor may require the signature of the other
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residences were listed on the husband’s assets, the creditor asked
questions to understand if any other individuals had rights to the listed
assets.101 The creditor did not engage in these questions for the sole
purpose of finding out if Mr. Camp was married and to force his wife to
guarantee the loan; rather, it is common practice for a creditor to inquire
about jointly held assets.102
In asking these questions, the creditor was ensuring it would have
access to the asset should the debtor default on payment. 103 If the creditor
did not have the guarantee of Mr. Camp’s wife, the person jointly owning
the asset, then the creditor would have difficulty collecting the asset if a
default occurred. 104 Therefore, the creditor was not forcing a spousal
guarantee; rather, the creditor was merely ensuring that in the event of a
default there would be no other individual claiming rights to the asset and
not allowing the creditor to seize the asset. 105 This would be a common
measure taken by a creditor regarding any jointly held asset regardless of
the debtor’s relationship with the co-owner. 106 Asking if an asset is
jointly owned does not necessarily mean it is an inquiry about marriage;

person only on the instrument(s) necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor to be
necessary, under the law of the state in which the property is located, to enable the creditor to
reach the property being relied upon in the event of the death or default of the applicant.”);
Moran, 476 F.3d at 442 (“It was therefore sound commercial practice unrelated to any
stereotypical view of a wife’s role for Moran to require that she guarantee the debt along with
her husband.”).
101. See Moran, 476 F.3d at 441–42 (“[W]hen Moran looked at the list of assets submitted
by Roger Camp, who had agreed to guarantee repayment of any debts that Mid-Atlantic
incurred to Moran, it noticed that several residences were included and so it naturally and
correctly assumed that Mrs. Camp had an interest in those assets.”).
102. See id. at 442 (“The residences of a married couple are usually owned either jointly
or by the spouse other than the one who included them in the list of assets that he submitted
to obtain credit. Often spouses don’t know the precise allocation of property between them
because it has been made by their lawyer . . . .”).
103. See id.
104. See id. (“In fact some $2.5 million of the $8.2 million in assets listed on Mr. Camp’s
credit application were actually owned by Mrs. Camp.”).
105. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(2) (“Unsecured credit. If an applicant requests unsecured
credit and relies in part upon property that the applicant owns jointly with another person to
satisfy the creditor’s standards of creditworthiness, the creditor may require the signature of
the other person only on the instrument(s) necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor
to be necessary, under the law of the state in which the property is located, to enable the
creditor to reach the property being relied upon in the event of the death or default of the
applicant.”); Moran, 476 F.3d at 442 (“It was therefore sound commercial practice unrelated
to any stereotypical view of a wife’s role for Moran to require that she guarantee the debt
along with her husband.”).
106. See Moran, 476 F.3d at 441–42 (explaining the normalcy of securing proper collateral
for a loan).
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an asset could be held jointly with a family member, friend, or business
partner.107
B.

Courts finding the ECOA’s Definition Ambiguous and Instead
Relying on Regulation B

Prior to Hawkins, and after the 1985 amendment of Regulation B,
the majority of courts deferred to the Regulation B definition of applicant.
They have allowed spousal guarantors to file claims under the ECOA. 108
Some courts give such deference to agency definitions, forgoing the
Chevron analysis and outright relying on the Board’s—and now
CFPB’s—interpretation.109
In RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group,
LLC, the Sixth Circuit held that “applicant” could be construed to include
guarantors due to the ambiguous definition within the ECOA, and
therefore, individuals can raise a violation of the ECOA as an affirmative
defense. 110 Bridgemill was one of two residential properties that Bernard
Dixon invested millions of dollars into in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis, which left him nearly $10 million in debt. 111 Mr. Dixon sought to
refinance his debt, but the bank deemed him not independently

107. See id. (“As far as appears [to the creditor], had they been unmarried but living
together, whether as boyfriend and girlfriend, or as siblings, or father and daughter, or just
roommates, as soon as Moran learned that Roger Camp was living with someone it would
have realized that one or more of the residences on Camp’s list of assets might be owned with
someone else or maybe owned entirely by someone else. And so it would have insisted on
the guaranty. If so, there was no discrimination on the basis of marital status.”).
108. See Hletko & Stapleton, supra note 27 (“Since the 1985 Amendment to Regulation
B, courts historically have deferred to the Board’s interpretation and permitted spousal
guarantors to bring claims under ECOA. The majority of state and federal courts considering
this issue, including the First, Third and Fourth Circuits, have axiomatically applied the
expanded definition without reaching the question of agency deference under the two-step
Chevron framework.”).
109. See Hletko & Stapleton, supra note 27; see, e.g., Mayes v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 167
F.3d 675, 677 (1st Cir. 1999) (looking to Regulation B’s definition of applicant without
applying Chevron); Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Inv’r Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 30–31 (3d
Cir. 1995) (accepting guarantors as applicants as the Regulation B definition described
without using Chevron’s two-prong approach); Ballard v. Bank of America, 734 F.3d 308,
310 n.1 (4th Cir. 2013) (deferring to the agency definition of applicant without using
Chevron); but see Moran, 476 F.3d (rendering the Seventh Circuit as the only federal circuit
court not to treat Regulation B’s definition of applicant as applicable prior to Hawkins).
110. RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 380,
381 (6th Cir. 2014) (“We hold that a violation of ECOA and Regulation B can be asserted as
an affirmative defense of recoupment.”).
111. Id. at 381–82.
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creditworthy. 112 The bank suggested he find additional collateral to be
able to receive a large enough loan to refinance the properties. 113 Mr.
Dixon pledged a large amount of stock and a corporate debenture, and
also offered his personal guarantee. 114 Furthermore, his wife, agreed to
pledge the same number of shares, which she owned individually. 115 In
addition to pledging her shares as collateral, Mrs. Dixon too executed a
personal guarantee. 116 Suit was brought against Mr. and Mrs. Dixon for
defaulting on the loan.117 Mrs. Dixon answered and claimed the
guarantee was void because it violated the ECOA. 118
The Sixth Circuit held the ECOA’s definition of “applicant” was
ambiguous and that guarantors could be considered applicants. 119 The
court reasoned the ECOA’s definition could include individuals that are
not personally applying for credit.120 The court reached this decision by
looking to the terms “applies” and “credit” in the statutory definition. 121
While applying Chevron, the court referenced the dictionary to provide

112. Id. at 382 (“Based on [Mabry Farms development owing $3.2 million to United
Community Bank and Bridgemill Commons development owing $6.4 million to Regions
Bank], BB&T concluded that Bernard and BCDG were not independently creditworthy for a
loan large enough to refinance both the Regions Loan and the UCB Loan.”).
113. Id. (“[The loan officer] suggested that BB&T could refinance the Regions Loan, so
long as Bernard could find additional collateral.”).
114. Id. (“To shore up the application, Bernard executed a personal guaranty, meaning that
he would be personally liable in the case of a default by the borrower.”).
115. Id.
116. Id. (“BB&T produced a summary of the requirements for the loan, which [the loan
officer] gave to Bernard on May, 2, 2008. Item one in the summary reads: ‘[Starr] will be
required to co-sign the notes with her future release subject to negotiation.’”); id. at 382–83
(“They also each executed a guaranty which made them individually liable for the amount
owed on the BCDG Note.”).
117. Id. (“On August 12, 2011, Plaintiff filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff asserted five causes of
action, including breach of guaranty against Starr.”).
118. Id. (“Starr asserted that her guaranty was unenforceable since it violated the ECOA
and Regulation B—specifically, Regulation B’s prohibition on requiring souses to guarantee
loans.”); see 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d) (2017).
119. See RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d. at 384–85 (rendering a decision by the Sixth Circuit
that the ECOA definition of “applicant” is ambiguous under a Chevron analysis).
120. Id. (interpreting the definition to mean it could “include third parties who do not
initiate an application for credit, and who do not seek credit for themselves”).
121. See id. (“‘[A]pplying the ordinary tools of statutory construction,’ we hold that the
statutory definition is ambiguous because it could be read to include third parties who do not
initiate an application for credit, and who do not seek credit for themselves—a category that
includes guarantors. We reach this conclusion based on two broad terms in the definition,
‘applies’ and ‘credit.’”).
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more clarity.122 The court acknowledged that there were multiple ways
to interpret “applies.”123 While it is likely “applies” would only refer to
the individual applying for credit, an acceptable interpretation would also
encompass guarantors.124
The Sixth Circuit further stated that the word “credit” as it is used
in the statutory definition adds even more ambiguity. 125 The ambiguity
exists because the definition explains “an ‘applicant’ requests credit, but
a ‘debtor’ reaps the benefit.”126 By using two different terms, the ECOA
allows the possibility that the applicant and the debtor are different
people. 127 Therefore, the court concluded “[i]f an applicant is not
necessarily the debtor, it would be reasonable to conclude that the
applicant could be a third party, such as a guarantor.”128
After determining that the ECOA’s statutory definition of
“applicant” was ambiguous, the court moved on to the second prong of
the Chevron test.129 This step questions whether the regulation arises
from an acceptable interpretation of the statute. 130 In answering the
122. Id. at 385; Applies, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 105 (1993) (“[V]erb:
to make an appeal or request esp. formally and often in writing and usu. For something of
benefit to oneself.”); Applies, OXFORD ENGLISH D ICTIONARY (3d ed. 2008), http://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/9724 (“[T]o make an approach to (a person) for information or aid;
to have recourse or make application to, to appeal to; to make a (formal) request for.”).
123. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d. at 385. (regarding the term “applies,” the court found
that while “one permissible reading of this term is that only the initial applicant can be deemed
to ‘apply’ for credit,” it is not the only way the statutory definition could be read).
124. Id. (reasoning that another interpretation of “applies” could be “all those who offer
promises in support of an application,” meaning the definition could also include guarantors
since they “make formal requests for aid in the form of credit for a third party”).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2002)) (suggesting there
is a possibility that “the applicant and the debtor are not always the same person.”
128. Id.
129. See id. (citations omitted) (“Moving from the text to ECOA’s larger context, we see
no reason to artificially limit the possible meanings of ‘applicant.’ ECOA prohibits
discrimination ‘with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction,’ and we have previously
notes that the statute has ‘broad remedial goals.’ This context confirms what the plan
language reveals—ECOA’s definition of ‘applicant’ could be construed to cover a guarantor.
The statute is therefore ambiguous and we move on to Chevron step two.”).
130. Id. (assessing the definition through Chevron requires asking “whether the regulation
stems from a permissible construction of the statute”); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Nat. Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“[If] the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, we would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”).
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question, the court did not need to find that the Regulation B definition
was the only possible definition to have upheld the purpose of the
statute.131 Rather, the court can defer to Regulation B’s definition if it
finds it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. 132 Since “at least one
of the natural meanings” of applicant includes guarantors, the court held
that the Regulation B definition including guarantors as applicants was
permissible. 133
C.

Legal Claims Available for Guarantors Based on the Definition
of “Applicant” Adopted

Further adding to the circuit split regarding whether guarantors
are applicants, both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have chosen to
follow the ECOA language rather than the definition including guarantors
in Regulation B. 134 However, in circuits that have deferred to the CFPB’s
interpretation, Regulation B language controls. 135 Beyond whether or not
a guarantor is an applicant, this differing language controls whether a
guarantor can file a claim or is limited only to an affirmative defense. 136
Filing a claim means guarantors could file suit at any point they felt their
rights had been violated.137 Availability of only an affirmative defense

131. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 385 (citing Alliance for Cmty. Media v. F.C.C., 529
F.3d 763, 778 (6th Cir. 2008)) (“[W]e need not conclude that the agency construction was the
only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even that the reading
[the court] would have reached if the question initially has arisen in a judicial proceeding.”).
132. See id. (using an agency definition requires the court to determine that “the agency’s
interpretation [ ] represents a permissible one entitled to deference.”).
133. Id. (citing Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 467 (6th Cir. 2006)).
134. See Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007);
Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 937 (8th Cir. 2014).
135. See Hletko & Stapleton, supra note 27 (explaining the First, Third and Fourth Circuits
have historically deferred to Regulation B’s definition of applicant and allowed spousal
guarantors to bring claims under the ECOA).
136. See Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Linch, 829 F. Supp. 163, 169 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(explaining violations of the ECOA cannot be raised as an affirmative defense, they may only
be raised as a claim or counterclaim); but see RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 384 (recognizing
that ECOA claims can be raised as an affirmative defense of recoupment; Bank of the W. v.
Kline, 782 N.W.2d 453, 462–63 (Iowa 2010) (holding defendants may assert violations of the
ECOA as the affirmative defense of illegality).
137. Abraham, supra note 3, at 487 (explaining that the downside of only having an
affirmative defense available would mean that defendants must wait until a legal action was
brought against them to defend themselves).
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means that guarantors must wait until a lawsuit has been filed against
them to assert a defense. 138
Under the statute, “applicants” have the ability to sue or
counterclaim for ECOA violations. 139 If the ECOA does not consider
guarantors to be applicants, then the ECOA does not provide a basis for
guarantors to sue.140 With this, several courts have decided that ECOA
violations are not affirmative defenses, and can only be raised in the form
of a claim or a counterclaim. 141
Regulation B, however, gives guarantors the opportunity to sue
for violations of the spousal guarantor rule. 142 Some courts have applied
Regulation B’s definition and allowed ECOA violations to be used as an
affirmative defense of illegality, which will completely invalidate the
guarantee. 143 Yet still, other courts use the Regulation B definition to
serve as a defense of recoupment.144 Recoupment “allows a defendant to
defend against a claim by asserting—up to the amount of the claim—the
138. See Abraham, supra note 3, at 487 (“[I]f the FRB’s definition of ‘applicant’ was not
read into the ECOA, it would require spousal guarantors to wait until the commencement of
legal action against them to assert an affirmative defense as to the legality of the guaranty. By
requiring the guarantor to wait, the guarantor might ‘experience financial difficulty to obtain
individual credit because of these large contingent liabilities, and suffer mental and emotional
distress resulting from the inability to obtain credit.’”).
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c) (2016) (“Action for equitable and declaratory relief. Upon
application by an aggrieved applicant, the appropriate United States district court or any other
court of competent jurisdiction may grant such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary
to enforce the requirements imposed under this title.”).
140. See id. (giving these rights only to “applicants” as defined in the ECOA).
141. See Riggs Nat’l Bank, 829 F. Supp. at 169 (“[T]he ECOA cannot be asserted as an
affirmative defense.”).
142. RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 380,
384 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Regulation B, however, contains its own definition of ‘applicant,’ [in
section 1002.2(e)] and that definition allows guarantors to sue for violations of the spouseguarantor rule.”); see 12 C.F.R. § 1002.16(b)(2) (2017) (“As provided in section 706(f) of the
Act, a civil action under the Act or this part may be brought in the appropriate United States
district court without regard to the amount in controversy or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction within five years after the date of the occurrence of the violation, or within one
year after the commencement of an administrative enforcement proceeding or of a civil action
brought by the Attorney General of the United States within five years after the alleged
violation.”).
143. See, e.g., Bank of the W. v. Kline, 782 N.W.2d 453, 462–63 (Iowa 2010) (“The basis
for allowing [the defendants] to assert the bank’s ECOA violation as affirmative defenses is
that their unlimited personal guaranties arose out of an illegal act and enforcement would be
contrary to public policy.”).
144. See Bolduc v. Beal Bank, SSB, 167 F.3d 667, 672 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[T]he common
law doctrine of recoupment, which allows a defendant to ‘defend’ against a claim by
asserting—up to the amount of the claim—the defendant’s own claim against the plaintiff
growing out of the same transaction. Recoupment is allowed even where the defendant’s
claim would be barred, if asserted in a separate action, by the statute of limitations.”).
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defendant’s own claim against the plaintiff growing out of the same
transaction.”145
Creditors are aware of these repercussions and have become
fearful of potential consequences associated with lending to married
couples. For example, if a creditor violates the ECOA, then the husband
and wife may not have to pay back the debt at all since it would be
considered void. Another risk is that the credit-lending institution could
be sued and be forced to return the money gained from the asset. 146
V. WHAT TWO DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS MEAN FOR ECOA
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Creditors, debtors, courts, and regulators were all looking to the
Supreme Court opinion in Hawkins for a definitive rule.147
Unfortunately, no such rule was established. 148 As long as the circuit split
remains,149 it is permissible for lower courts outside of the Sixth, Seventh,
and Eighth Circuits to continue forming their own opinions. 150
The ECOA is subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of both state
and federal courts, meaning it is permissible for state and federal courts
to decide differently on the issue. 151 In states like Missouri, for example,
the fate of the verdict is ultimately dependent upon what court system the

145. RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 387 (quoting Bolduc, 167 F.3d at 672).
146. See Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007)

(“Where the guaranty is rendered legally unenforceable, the creditor may be forced to lose the
entire debt.”); RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 386 (emphasis added) (“Furthermore, we are
not troubled by the prospect of guarantors being made whole after a creditor violates the law.
A creditor will only lose its entire debt if the borrower immediately defaults and the pledged
collateral turns out to be worthless. We will not strike down a valid regulation to salvage bad
underwriting.”).
147. See Edge, supra note 11 (“Until this issue is resolved by the Supreme Court, if ever,
banks in the 8th Circuit will wonder whether they should listen to the judiciary or Federal
Reserve Examiners who frequent their banks.”).
148. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1072 (2016).
149. See Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072 (rendering an equally divided Supreme Court per
curiam).
150. See, e.g., RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 380 (ruling guarantors are considered
applicants, and therefore spousal guarantors may seek protection under the ECOA); Moran,
476 F.3d at 436 (holding wives are not considered applicants and therefore spouses cannot
use the ECOA as protection when they are guarantors).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c) (2016) (“Upon application by an aggrieved applicant, the
appropriate United States district court or any other court of competent jurisdiction may grant
such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce the requirements imposed
under this sub chapter.”).
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action is filed in.152 Since there is no binding authority for all to adhere
to, creditors in different jurisdictions must abide by different rules, and
some have to guess which law to follow. 153 The lack of guidance poses
a challenge for regional areas, as neighboring states and circuits have
different determinations and the confusion has also become a major
obstacle for different courts within the same state. 154
If lenders remain unsure of what they can and cannot do, and
continue to face negative repercussions in some jurisdictions, it may
result in more difficulty for a married person to receive a loan. 155 A
creditor is unlikely to continue loaning large credit lines to married
borrowers knowing that if the loan was guaranteed by a spouse, there is
a chance the creditor will not receive payment from the guaranteed
assets.156 This would require those seeking credit to find another
guarantor.157 Some individuals may have a business partner or other
152. See Arvest Bank v. Uppalapti, 2013 WL 85336, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Jan 7, 2013)
(adopting the view expressed in Moran that a guarantor is not an applicant); Champion Bank
v. Reg’l Dev., LLC, 2009 WL 1351122 at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 13, 2009) (following Moran’s
decision that guarantors are not applicants); Frontenac Bank v. T.R. Hughes, Inc. 404 S.W.3d
272, 291 (Mo. Appl. E.D. 2012) (denying Moran’s reasoning and instead deciding that
guarantors are applicants); Boone Nat’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Crouch, 47 S.W.3d 371, 376
(Mo. Banc. 2001) (finding that guarantors are applicants).
153. See Edge, supra note 11 (“For banks that do business across state lines, this could be
an interesting issue.”); see Hletko & Stapleton, supra note 27, at n.50 (“[C]reditors outside of
the Eighth and Seventh Circuits should assume that the Sixth Circuit rule applies to avoid
potential liability for impermissibly requiring spousal guarantees.”); but see Chris Bruce,
Deadlocked Justices Back Bank on ECOA, Guarantors, BNA (Mar. 22, 2016), https://
buckleysandler.com/news/2016-03-25/valerie-hletko-quoted-bloomberg-bna-articledeadlocked-justices-back-bank-ecoa-guarantors (“[B]anks have a reasonable degree of
assurance that they may obtain guaranties from spouses of married business owners.”).
154. See Edge, supra note 11 (“Our neighbors in Arkansas will have one definition of
‘applicant’ for ECOA purposes, and Tennessee, another.”).
155. See Edge, supra note 11 (“Until this issue is resolved by the Supreme Court, if ever,
banks in the 8th Circuit will wonder whether they should listen to the judiciary or Federal
Reserve Examiners who frequent their banks.”).
156. See Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt.Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Where the guaranty is rendered legally unenforceable, the creditor may be forced to lost the
entire debt.”); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d
380, 386 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Furthermore, we are not troubled by the prospect to guarantors
being made whole after a creditor violates the law. A creditor will only lose its entire debt if
the borrower immediately defaults and the pledged collateral turns out to be worthless. We
will not strike down a valid regulation to salvage bad underwriting.”).
157. See SMALL B US. ADMIN., SMALL BUS. RES.: FOR NORTHERN CAL. 2 (Mar. 20, 2017),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/resource_files/SBA_one_pager_for_digit
al_distribution_-_03-2017.pdf (“Each person who owns 20% or more of the business must
provide a personal guaranty of the loan, and must have satisfactory personal credit. When
evaluating applications for approval, lenders often consider the applicant’s character and
credit, management capability, collateral, and the owner’s equity contribution.”).
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individual willing to sign for them, however, many individuals rely on
spouses to guarantee their debts. 158 Not allowing creditors to accept
spousal guarantees could limit the amount of credit a person could
receive. 159 This would effectively mean that the ECOA, which was
enacted to disallow credit-lending discrimination on the basis of marital
status, constricts opportunities for credit based on one’s marital status.160
A.

Positive and Negative Impacts of Spousal Guarantors

Creditors requiring spousal guarantors conflicts with Congress’
express intent in passing the ECOA. 161 Requiring a spouse to guarantee
a debt is essentially forcing a wife to become liable for everything the
husband would be liable for should he default. 162 This is a much larger
undertaking than requiring a wife to grant a lien on her interest in jointly
held property. 163 The scope would be broadened to include everything

158. See Bill Fay, Loan Agreements with Family and Friends, DEBT.ORG, https://
www.debt.org/credit/loans/friends-family/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“According to the
Federal Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances, loans from family and friends amount
to $89 billion each year in the United States. The most popular reasons for asking family
members or friends for a loan are to start a business or purchase a home. A national survey
by Fundable said 38% of startup businesses relied on money from family or friends.”).
159. See Justin Pritchard, Personal Guarantee Basics, THE BALANCE, https://
www.thebalance.com/personal-guarantee-basics-315207 (last updated Feb. 14, 2017)
(“Lenders always evaluate borrowers to predict whether or not they’ll repay. For consumer
loans, there are credit scores and numerous other sources of information to help with the
decision. However, businesses—especially new businesses and operations that have never
borrowed—probably don’t have a business-specific credit history. With limited information
it’s hard for lenders to make a decision. They would be more comfortable if they could see
that you’ve borrowed money in the past and consistently repaid loans. When they can’t make
a decision based on historical information, they require some sort of security (or they charge
an extremely high interest rate). That security often comes in the form of a personal guarantee,
although other approaches such as pledging business assets as collateral, can be used.”).
160. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521, 1521 (1974)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2016)) (“The Congress finds that there is a need to insure that
the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extensions of credit exercise
their responsibility to make credit available with fairness, impartiality, and without
discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status.”).
161. Id.
162. See Sam Thacker, Personal Guarantees Required in Small Business Loans, ALL B US.,
https://www.allbusiness.com/personal-guarantees-required-in-small-business-loans10753236-1.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“An individual being asked to sign an unlimited
personal guarantee is being asked to sign a guarantee that a lender will recover from the
guarantor 100% of any outstanding loans made and any and all legal fees associated with the
loan.”).
163. Id.
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the wife owns independently as well. 164 Requiring a spousal guarantee,
rather than allowing a spouse to choose to guarantee, means a spouse is
bound to a debt solely due to their spouse’s independent decision to take
out a loan.165 This results in forcing individuals to be guarantors due to
their marital status.166 The other alternative is for individuals to decide
against borrowing when faced with the reality that both spouses will have
to guarantee the debt, which would in-turn negatively impact the
availability of credit.167
While it should not be permissible for a creditor to force a spouse
to guarantee a loan, it may be necessary for a creditor to inquire about a
debtor’s marital status.168 In many states spouses may jointly hold assets,
such as holding property through tenancy by the entirety. 169 Some
164. See Id.; JUSTIN M. LEWIS, WARD AND SMITH, P.A, CLIENT ALERT: HOW SHOULD TWO

MORE PEOPLE OWN PROPERTY? DOES IT MATTER (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.war
dandsmith.com/articles/how-should-two-or-more-people-own-property-does-it-matter (“[A]
lien or judgment docketed against one spouse will not attach to property owned as tenants by
the entirety because the property is not owned by the husband or the wife, but by the marital
entity.”).
165. NORMAN J. LEONARD, WARD AND SMITH, P.A, CLIENT ALERT: SPOUSAL
GUARANTIES—CLARIFYING THE RULES OF GOVERNING PERSONAL GUARANTIES FROM SPOUSES
(Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.wardandsmith.com/articles/personal-guaranties-from-spousesof-borrowers (“[C]ourts have frequently held that it is illegal for a lender to require a spousal
guaranty if the sole reason the lender is requiring it is that the spouse happens to be married
to the person seeking the loan.”).
166. Id.
167. See Fay, supra note 158 (explaining most individuals require a guarantee from
someone else to be eligible for credit).
168. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(2) (2017) (“Unsecured credit. If an applicant requests
unsecured credit and relies in part upon property that the applicant owns jointly with another
person to satisfy the creditor’s standards of creditworthiness, the creditor may require the
signature of the other person only on the instrument(s) necessary, or reasonably believed by
the creditor to be necessary, under the law of the state in which the property is located, to
enable the creditor to reach the property being relied upon in the event of the death or default
of the applicant.”); 12 C.F.R § 1002.7(d)(3) (“If a married applicant requests unsecured credit
and resides in a community property state, or if the applicant is relying on property located in
such a state, a creditor may require the signature of the spouse on any instrument necessary,
or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary, under applicable state law to make the
community property available to satisfy the debt . . . .”).
169. See Julie Garber, Property Titles and Tenants by the Entirety, THE BALANCE, https://
www.thebalance.com/tenants-by-the-entirety-3505608 (May 12, 2017) (“[In a tenancy by the
entirety each] spouse individually own[s] the entire property as a tenant by the entirety.
Husband and wife are treated as a single legal entity.”); Joint Property and Concurrent
Ownership, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/joint-property-concurrentownership-32229.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“In some states that do recognize tenancies
by the entirety, a creditor is allowed to collect a spouse’s debts from the interests of the
property as a whole (as long as the debtor spouse is still alive). Other states have banned this
practice and only allow a collector to foreclose on a tenancy if both spouses are liable for the
underlying debt.”).
OR
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married persons do not have enough individually-owned assets to serve
as adequate collateral to banks. If they are unable to list jointly-owned
assets, then it may not be possible for them to receive credit. 170
While there are benefits to allowing spousal guarantors, there are
also downsides. One downside is couples attempting to beat the system
by later claiming a spousal guarantee was an ECOA violation. 171 For
example, many married couples have joint assets, and not having a spouse
guarantee the assets as collateral may mean the creditor could not seize
the assets.172 If a creditor sues a debtor to collect on the debt and some
of the debtor’s assets are owned jointly with the spouse, they may be free
of the creditor’s claim. 173 Thus, the creditor needs the debtor and their
spouse to be guarantors so that the jointly owned assets are available to

170. See Fay, supra note 158 (“According to the Federal Reserve Board Survey of
Consumer Finances, loans from family and friends amount to $89 billion each year in the
United States. The most popular reasons for asking family members or friends for a loan are
to start a business or purchase a home. A national survey by Fundable said 38% of startup
businesses relied on money from family or friends.”).
171. See Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Where the guaranty is rendered legally unenforceable, the creditor may be forced to lose the
entire debt.”); Alexander Hurst, Reg. B Is No Guaranty: Missouri Courts’ Openly Divergent
Views on the Enforceability of Coerced Spousal Guaranties in Commercial Lending, 79 MO.
L. REV. 467, 468 (2014) (“[R]elying on Reg. B’s ostensible protection, married individuals
can attempt to avoid liability for their spouse’s default after having been forced to personally
guarantee the obligation.”).
172. See 1 JOYCE PALOMAR & ROBERT WILCOX, PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES §
224 (3d ed. 2002) (“[A]ny conveyance or encumbrance of tenancy by the entirety property
must be signed by both spouses in order to be effective. Also, a creditor of one spouse may
not be able to reach property or proceeds from property held in tenancy by the entirety.”);
Tenancy By The Entirety States and Community Property States, ASSET PROTECTION
PLANNERS,
https://www.assetprotectionplanners.com/planning/tenancy-by-the-entiretystates-and-community-property-states/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (“Tenancy by the Entirety
ownership lets spouses own property together as a legal unit. It does not permit the creditors
of an individual spouse to seize and sell the interest of the debtor spouse. Therefore, it can be
thought of as a small part of an overall asset protection plan. Only creditors who have
judgments against both the husband and the wife may attach and sell property held in this
manner.”).
173. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(2) (“If an applicant requests unsecured credit and relies in
part upon property that the applicant owns jointly with another person to satisfy the creditor’s
standards of creditworthiness, the creditor may require the signature of the other person only
on the instrument(s) necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary, under
the law of the state in which the property is located, to enable the creditor to reach the property
being relied upon in the event of the death or default of the applicant.”); 12 C.F.R. §
1002.7(d)(4) (“If an applicant requests secured credit, a creditor may require the signature of
the applicant’s spouse or other person on any instrument necessary, or reasonably believed by
the creditor to be necessary, under applicable state law to make the property being offered as
security available to satisfy the debt in the event of default, for example, an instrument to
create a valid lien, pass clear title, waive inchoate rights, or assign earnings.”).
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satisfy the judgment for an unpaid debt.174 Using Regulation B’s
language as a shield is a tactic married couples have used to ensure they
could escape some or all liability should a default occur.175 If a court
were to decide that requiring the spouse to guarantee the loan was in fact
a violation of the ECOA on the creditor’s behalf, it could mean that some
or all of the loan would not have to be paid back in the event of a
default.176
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION BY CONGRESS AND THE
CFPB
Due to judicial stalemate, Congress must legislate to answer
whether or not spousal guarantors are afforded the same rights and
remedies as applicants under the ECOA. If Congress members do
legislate on the issue, they should be very intentional and explicit in their
language to eliminate similar confusion arising in the future. Similar to
how the ECOA goes into detail about who is considered an applicant,
Congress should elaborate further to explain who exactly is a guarantor,
as well as explain who is not. 177 The revised statute should consider
spousal guarantors as applicants.178 Similar to Regulation B, the ECOA
definition should include a section about spouses. 179 This section should
174. See PALOMAR & WILCOX, supra note 172 (“[A] creditor of one spouse may not be
able to reach property or proceeds from property held in tenancy by the entirety.”).
175. See Hurst, supra note 171, at 468 n.3 (citing Andrew B. Lustigman & Alicia M.
Serfaty, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act as a Defense Against Payment: How Lenders Can
Strike Back, 111 BANK. L. J. 444, 445 (1994)) (“[Debtors will] seek, through any separation
of an ECOA claim, to declare the underlying note or guaranty obligation void and
unenforceable.”).
176. Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Where the guaranty is rendered legally unenforceable, the creditor may be forced to lose the
entire debt.”).
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2016) (defining applicant as “any person who applies to a
creditor directly for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, or applies to a creditor
indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an amount exceeding a previously established
credit limit”); contra 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2 (e) (2017) (defining applicant as any person who
requests or who has received an extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person
who is or may become contractually liable regarding an extension of credit. For purposes of §
1002.7(d), the term includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and similar parties.).
178. See Bruce, supra note 153 (“In May, the U.S. Solicitor General filed a brief urging
the Supreme Court to reverse the Eighth Circuit, saying the CFPB deserves deference on the
question.”).
179. See Bruce, supra note 153 (suggesting others are worried about spousal guarantors
not being considered applicants); RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev.
Group, LLC, 754 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[A] portion of Regulation B . . . refer[red]
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include language explaining that spouses are permissible guarantors so
long as it is an option and not a requirement. 180 The statute should
explicitly state that a bank cannot force a spouse to sign as a guarantor,
or refuse a loan solely because a spouse will not guarantee it, meaning a
creditor cannot present a spouse with an ultimatum of sign this or your
spouse will not receive credit.181 Spousal guarantors should be
considered applicants under the statute so that in the event a creditor
violates the ECOA and requires a spousal guarantee, the guarantor spouse
can raise an affirmative defense under the ECOA. 182
While modifying the definition within the ECOA would be the
best option to eliminate confusion, it does not seem likely Congress will
amend the language. 183 This issue has been questioned in numerous
courts, and there have been several amendments to the ECOA since the
Board included guarantors in the definition of applicant, with no further
indication if guarantors are considered applicants under the language of
the ECOA.184

to as the ‘spousal-guarantor rule,’ which prohibits a creditor from requiring an applicant’s
spouse to guarantee a credit instrument, even if the creditor requires someone to execute a
guaranty.”).
180. See RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 383 (“[A] portion of Regulation B . . . refer[red]
to as the ‘spousal-guarantor rule,’ which prohibits a creditor from requiring an applicant’s
spouse to guarantee a credit instrument, even if the creditor requires someone to execute a
guaranty.”); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.7(d)(5) (2017) (“The applicant’s spouse may serve as an
additional party [supporting the application], but the creditor shall not require that the spouse
be the additional party.”).
181. See RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 383 (“[A] portion of Regulation B . . . refer[red]
to as the ‘spousal-guarantor rule,’ which prohibits a creditor from requiring an applicant’s
spouse to guarantee a credit instrument, even if the creditor requires someone to execute a
guaranty.”).
182. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c) (2016) (“Action for equitable and declaratory relief. Upon
application by an aggrieved applicant, the appropriate United States district court or any other
court of competent jurisdiction may grant such equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary
to enforce the requirements imposed under this title.”); 71 FED. RES. BULL., REVISION OF THE
BOARD’S EQUAL CREDIT REGULATION: AN OVERVIEW 919 (1985) (“[E]nforcement through
private lawsuits. . . gives the guarantor the right to bring a lawsuit or to file a counterclaim
against a creditor.”).
183. See RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 385 (“Congress has also been unmoved by [a
creditor losing an entire debt if spousal-guarantors are considered applicants]. ECOA has
undergone several amendments since the Federal Reserve included guarantors within the
definition of ‘applicant’—including an extensive amendment to the statute after Moran was
decided—and none has clarified that the term ‘applicant’ cannot include guarantors.”).
184. Id.; see Aimee L. Ezzell, The CFPB Finalizes Amendments to ECOA Regulations and
Seeks Public Comment on HMDA Policy Guidance, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 27, 2017), https://
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a680ee2d-1b89-4955-b5a068fada145f15.american-economy-part-i-consumer-demand-for-credit/
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Alternatively, the CFPB can amend Regulation B if Congress
refuses to act. Although it does not seem that an amendment to
Regulation B would solve the overarching issue, it is possible that a ninemember Supreme Court could hear another case regarding spousal
guarantors and decide the ECOA language pertaining to applicants is
ambiguous.185 If the Court found the language was ambiguous, they
would defer to the definitions contained in Regulation B. 186 If the CFPB
amended Regulation B’s language, it would be wise to add in “spousal
guarantors” to the list of persons that qualify as applicants in 12 C.F.R. §
1002.2(e).187 Additionally, the CFPB should further elaborate what
exactly it means to require a spouse to guarantee a loan and describe more
specifically what a creditor is forbidden from doing in 12 C.F.R. §
1002.7(d)(5).188 The clarification should add that creditors cannot
present ultimatums and state that should a spouse of an otherwise
creditworthy individual not guarantee a loan, then there will be no line of
credit extended. 189 An amended Regulation B could resolve issues like
these as well as provide guidance to creditors and borrowers in the
future.190
VII. CONCLUSION
While there is much confusion and discussion surrounding
ECOA violations due to marital status, using the Chevron test, it appears
both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have come down correctly based on
?utm_term=.510c93cab79c (describing the most recent amendments to the ECOA which does
not include an addition of guarantors to the definition of applicant).
185. See RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 384–85 (“‘[A]pplying the ordinary tools of
statutory construction,’ we hold that the [ECOA] definition [of applicant] is ambiguous.”).
186. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (“[I]f the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
187. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (2017) (“Applicant means any person who requests or who has
received an extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may become
contractually liable regarding an extension of credit. For purposes of § 1002.7(d), the term
includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and similar parties.”).
188. § 1002.7(d)(5) (“The applicant’s spouse may serve as an additional party, but the
creditor shall not require that the spouse be the additional party.”).
189. Id.; RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 383 (suggesting that forcing a spouse to guarantee
a loan by using an ultimatum would not be permissible because the spousal-guarantor rule
“prohibits a creditor from requiring an applicant’s spouse to guarantee a credit instrument”).
190. See 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (adding guarantors into the definition of applicant has
already taken a step to clearing up that spousal-guarantors should have rights under the
ECOA).
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statutory interpretation.191 Based on the plain language, a guarantor is
not an applicant under the strict statutory definition of applicant in the
ECOA. 192 While there is a valid argument as to why we would want to
include spousal guarantors as applicants to afford them protection under
the ECOA, under the current statutory language, there is no ambiguity,
and therefore no room for spousal protection under the ECOA as it
reads. 193
Just because a court has to interpret statutes as written does not
mean they are the correct decision; it only means that they are the
judicially appropriate interpretation. 194 The best-case scenario to
eliminate this confusion would be for Congress to speak on the matter
and give closure to the issue of whether or not a guarantor, or specifically
a spousal guarantor, will be considered an applicant. 195 While that would
be ideal, it does not seem likely that Congress will step in to eliminate the
confusion if it has not already.196 Although perhaps seeing that the U.S.
Solicitor General filed a brief urging a reversal of Hawkins and the fact
that the issue remains unsolved by the Supreme Court will provide the
motivation necessary to resolve this issue. 197
191. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1072 (2016); see Hawkins v.
Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 943 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining that guarantors are
not considered applicants based on the definition within the statute itself); Moran Foods, Inc.
v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2007) (excluding guarantors from the
category of applicant due to a strict statutory reading).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b) (2016) (“The term ‘applicant’ means any person who applies
to a creditor directly for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit, or applies to a
creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan for an amount exceeding a previously
established credit limit.”).
193. Id.
194. See Leon Friedman, Overruling the Court, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001),
http://prospect.org/article/overruling-court (“One of the myths of our political system is that
the Supreme Court has the last word on the scope and meaning of federal law. But time and
time again, Congress has shown its dissatisfaction with Supreme Court interpretations of laws
it passes—by amending or re-enacting the legislation to clarify its original intent and overrule
a contrary Court construction.”).
195. Id.
196. See RL BB Acquisition, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons Dev. Group, LLC, 754 F.3d
380, 385 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Congress has also been unmoved by [a creditor losing an entire
debt if spousal-guarantors are considered applicants]. ECOA has undergone several
amendments since the Federal Reserve included guarantors within the definition of
‘applicant’—including an extensive amendment to the statute after Moran was decided—and
none has clarified that the term ‘applicant’ cannot include guarantors.”).
197. See Bruce, supra note 150 (“In May, the U.S. Solicitor General filed a brief urging
the Supreme Court to reverse the Eighth Circuit, saying the CFPB deserves deference on the
question.”); Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Regions Bank v. Legal Outsource, No. 17-11736
(11th Cir. Sept. 11, 2017) (rising to another circuit court is the issue of spousal guarantors and
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If Congress does not amend the statutory definition and speak to
the issue of marital status violations of the ECOA, all we can do is wait.
Creditors, debtors, and courts alike will all have to wait until this issue is
again heard by the Supreme Court to provide binding authority as the
supreme law of the land, and provide one unifying decision for all lower
courts to abide by. 198
It would be best for Congress to amend the ECOA to ensure it is
aligned with what they intended as well as to fulfill the necessary current
goals of the Act. Absent Congressional action, those engaged in credit
transactions outside the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits will be
uncertain as to the application of the ECOA to spousal guarantees unless
and until the Supreme Court takes another look at this issue on which the
circuit courts are split.
KATHERINE S. CLARKE

the definition of applicant; this demonstrates there is still a need for a definitive answer on
whether guarantors are applicants).
198. See Hawkins, 136 S. Ct. at 1072 (rendering an equally divided Supreme Court per
curiam); RL BB Acquisition, 754 F.3d at 380 (finding the ECOA definition to be ambiguous
and instead relying on the Regulation B definition and ultimately ruling spousal guarantors
are considered applicants); Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atlantic Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436
(7th Cir. 2007) (holding wives are not considered applicants and therefore spouses cannot use
the ECOA as protection when they are guarantors).

